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Abstract. We study dynamic unstructured bargaining with deadlines and one-sided pri-
vate information about the amount available to share (the “pie size”). Using mechanism
design theory, we show that given the players’ incentives, the equilibrium incidence of
bargaining failures (“strikes”) should increase with the pie size, and we derive a condi-
tion under which strikes are efficient. In our setting, no equilibrium satisfies both equality
and efficiency in all pie sizes. We derive two equilibria that resolve the trade-off between
equality and efficiency by favoring either equality or efficiency. Using a novel experimen-
tal paradigm, we confirm that strike incidence is decreasing in the pie size. Subjects reach
equal splits in small pie games (in which strikes are efficient), while most payoffs are close
to either the efficient or the equal equilibrium prediction, when the pie is large.We employ
a machine learning approach to show that bargaining process features recorded early in
the game improve out-of-sample prediction of disagreements at the deadline. The process
feature predictions are as accurate as predictions from pie sizes only, and adding process
and pie data together improves predictions even more.
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1. Introduction
Bargaining is everywhere in economic activity: from
price haggling in flea markets, to wage negotiations
between unions and firms, to high-stakes diplomacy.
Even in competitive, large-scale markets, sequences of
market trades often result from individual buyer–seller
partners bargaining over a range of mutually agreeable
contract terms, knowing their outside options from
the market. Bargaining failures such as holdouts and
strikes—due to disputes over what each side should
get—are also common and reduce welfare.
Strikes are surprising because in almost every case,
the bargain that was eventually struck after a costly
strike could have been agreed to much earlier in the
bargaining, which would have saved lost profits, legal
bills, and many other collateral costs. Then why do
strikes happen? The standard approach in the game
theory of private-information bargaining is that the
willingness to endure a strike is the only way for one
side to credibly convince the bargaining partner that
their existing offer is inadequate. Although making a
deal appears to be a better outcome for both sides,
when players’ incentives and information are taken
into account, strikes are not just efficient: they can also
be unavoidable (Kennan and Wilson 1990).
Private information bargaining theories, and tests of
these theories, have developed in two ways:
(1) The most popular way is bargaining theories
based on highly structured settings (e.g., Ståhl 1972 or
Rubinstein 1982; for a review, see Ausubel et al. 2002).
“Structure” means that the rules of how bargaining
proceeds are clearly specified in the theory. The rules
typically define when bargaining must be completed
(either a deadline or an infinite horizon), who can
offer or counteroffer and at what time, when offers are
accepted, whether communication is allowed (and in
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what form), and so on. Theoretical predictions of out-
comes and payoffs depend sensitively on these struc-
tural features.1 Following the burst of progress in game
theory on structured private-information bargaining,
a large experimental literature emerged testing these
theories.2
The clear assumptions about structure in the theory
made experimental design and theory-testing straight-
forward.
(2) The less popular way of theorizing and experi-
mentation in economics is based on unstructured bar-
gaining. Our paper returns to this less popular route,
exploring unstructured bargaining with one-sided pri-
vate information in an experiment.
There are three good reasons to study unstructured
bargaining.
First, most natural two-player bargaining is not
highly structured. Conventional methods for conduct-
ing bargaining do emerge in natural settings, but
these methods are rarely constrained, because there
are no penalties for deviating from conventions. Study-
ing unstructured bargaining is of particular impor-
tance, as strategic behavior may substantially differ
between static and dynamic environments that allow
continuous-time interaction (Friedman and Oprea
2012). There may also be clear empirical regularities
in unstructured bargaining—such as deadline effects
(Roth et al. 1988, Gächter and Riedl 2005)—that are evi-
dent in the data but not predicted by theory. Establish-
ing these regularities can lead theorizing, rather than
test theory.
Second, unstructured bargaining creates a large
amount of interesting data during the bargaining pro-
cess. Players can make offers at any time, retract offers,
and so on. Of course, theories can gain precision
by ignoring these process data. However, if process
variables are systematically associated with outcomes,
these empirical regularities both challenge simple equi-
librium theories and invite new theory development.
Indeed, we use process data in a new way: To pre-
dict which bargaining trials will result in deals and
strikes. We use a penalized regression approach from
machine learning, to select those features from a large
number of process features and make out-of-sample,
cross-validated predictions (guarding against overfit-
ting). The process features can predict strikes about as
accurately as the pie sizes can; adding both process and
pie size together makes even better predictions.
Process data are also useful because practical nego-
tiation advice often consists of simple heuristics about
how to bargain well (Pruitt 2013). For example, negoti-
ation researchers long ago postulated that initial offers
might serve as bargaining anchors, and that vari-
ous psychological manipulations, such as perspective
taking, could potentially bias bargaining outcomes.3
Advice like this can be easily tested by carefully con-
trolled experimental designs that allow structure-free
bargaining while keeping the process fully tractable,
such as our paradigm.
Third, even when bargaining is unstructured, the-
ory can still be applied to make clear interesting pre-
dictions. A natural intuition is that when bargaining
methods are unstructured, no clear predictions can be
made, as if the lack of structure in the bargaining pro-
tocol must imply a lack of structure (or precision) in
predictions. This intuition is just not right. In the case
we study, clear predictions about unstructured bar-
gaining do emerge, thanks to the “revelation princi-
ple” (Myerson 1979, 1984). This principle has the useful
property of implying empirical predictions for nonco-
operative equilibria, independently of the bargaining
protocol, based purely on the information structure.
For example, the application of the revelation princi-
ple in our setting leads to the prediction that strikes
will become less common as the amount of surplus
the players are bargaining over grows. This type of
prediction is nonobvious and can be easily tested. Fur-
thermore, if additional assumptions are made about
equilibrium offers, and combined with the revelation
principle, then exact numerical predictions about offers
and deal rates can be made. That is, even if the bar-
gaining protocol lacks structure, predictions can have
plenty of restricted “structure.”4
2. Background
2.1. Experimental Economic Literature of
Unstructured Bargaining
The experimental literature on bargaining is vast, so
belowwe only focus on studies closely related to ours.5
Before theoretical breakthroughs in the understand-
ing of structured bargaining, most experiments used
unstructured communication. The main focus of inter-
est was process-free solution concepts such as the
Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950), and important
extensions (e.g., Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975). We will
refer to the amount of surplus available to share as
the “pie.” Many bargains (Nydegger and Owen 1974,
Roth and Malouf 1979) led to an equal split of the
pie. Roth suggested that “bargainers sought to iden-
tify initial bargaining positions that had some special
reasons for being credible... that served as focal points
that then influenced the subsequent conduct of nego-
tiation” (Roth 1985, p. 259). Under information asym-
metries, disagreements may arise due to coordination
difficulties. Several papers by Roth and colleagues then
explored what happens when players bargain over
points that have different financial value to players
(Roth and Malouf 1979, Roth et al. 1981, Roth and
Murnighan 1982, Roth 1985). In theory, there should
be no disagreements in these games, but a modest
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percentage of trials (10%–20%) did result in disagree-
ment. Many of the disagreements could be traced to
self-serving differences between which of two focal
points should be adopted—whether to allocate points
equally or the money, resulting from points, equally.
Focal points have remained an important theme in
more recent work.6 Roth et al. (1988) also drew atten-
tion to the fact that the largemajority of agreements are
made just before a (known) deadline, an observation
called the “deadline effect.”
Several experiments have observed what happens in
unstructured bargaining with two-sided private infor-
mation (Valley et al. 2002). The typical finding is that
in face-to-face and unstructured communication via
message passing, there are fewer disagreements than
predicted by theory.7 However, when players bargain-
ing can only make a single offer, disagreements are
more common, and the key predictions of theory hold
surprisingly well (Radner and Schotter 1989, Rapoport
et al. 1995, Rapoport and Fuller 1995, Daniel et al. 1998).
The closest precursor to our design is that of
Forsythe, Kennan, and Sopher (henceforth FKS), who
studied unstructured bargaining with one-sided pri-
vate information about the sizes of two possible pies
(Forsythe et al. 1991).8 They used mechanism design
to identify properties shared by all Bayesian equilibria
of any bargaining game, using the revelation princi-
ple (Myerson 1979, 1984). This approach gives a “strike
condition” predicting when disagreements would be
ex ante efficient. They tested their theory by conducting
several experimental treatments, with free-form com-
munication. The results qualitatively match the the-
ory. We generalize their earlier model to capture any
finite number of pie sizes. Because there are several dif-
ferent pie sizes, equilibria which maximize efficiency
or equality create different predictions, which we test.
Our experimental design uses six pie sizes with rapid
bargaining (10 seconds per trial), where bargaining
occurs only through visible offers and counteroffers,
with no other restrictions. They also did not analyze
their process data at all, whereaswe usemachine learn-
ing analysis of the process features to predict strikes on
a trial-by-trial basis.
From the literature studying structured bargaining,
Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993; henceforth MN) is a
closely related design. They study ultimatum bargain-
ingwith incomplete information.MNuse the same dis-
tribution over pie sizes in ultimatum bargaining that
we employ in unstructured bargaining. The pattern
of payoffs and disagreements in our results is similar
to that of MN’s “offer” game, in which the informed
player makes an ultimatum proposal. Our results gen-
eralize their conclusion that fairness and equality con-
cerns matter in asymmetric information ultimatum
bargaining to a less structured environment.
2.2. The Equality vs. Efficiency Trade-off
Another branch of literature in economics that is
related to our study is the experimental work investi-
gating how humans resolve trade-offs between equal-
ity and efficiency. While this question is still under
(heated) debate,9 it is largely accepted that people
are heterogeneous with respect to how they prioritize
these factors.10
A few recent papers have investigated highly struc-
tured strategic interactions (De Bruyn and Bolton 2008,
Blanco et al. 2011, Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn 2014,
López-Pérez et al. 2015), and some have examined
free-form bargaining with full information (Herreiner
and Puppe 2004, Galeotti et al. 2015). We extend this
literature by deriving theoretical predictions, and we
test empirically how humans resolve the equality–
efficiency trade-off in a dynamic strategic environment
with informational asymmetry.
2.3. Negotiation Research
Finally, our study closely relates to negotiation research
(Pruitt 2013), a branch of social psychology and orga-
nizational behavior research. In contrast to economic
theories that typically describe behavior in equilibrium
(i.e., when players best respond to each other’s actions),
negotiation theories assume that bargainers are not in
equilibrium and focus on prescriptivemodels, inwhich
adopting certain strategies improves negotiation out-
comes. Negotiation researchers take into account the
process of bargaining by studying psychological con-
structs such as aspirations, defined as “the highest val-
ued outcome (in utility terms) at which the negotia-
tor places a non-negligible likelihood that value would
be accepted by the other party(ies)” (White and Neale
1994, p. 304). Aspirations played an important role
in determining the bargainers’ initial offers and were
shown to influence bargaining outcome variables such
as deal rates and surplus division.11
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 3, we usemechanism design theory to derive
general qualitative properties of bargaining in equi-
librium. We show that in our setting, no equilibrium
satisfies both equality and efficiency in all states of the
world, and we propose two equilibria that solve this
trade-off by either favoring the former or the latter.
We present a novel experimental design in Section 4,
and summarize its general results in Section 5. We use
machine learning to examine how bargaining process
data can be associated with bargaining outcome vari-
ables in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
3. Theory
In this section, we develop a theory that provides
testable predictions of deal rates and surplus division.
Our model combines two methods to analyze bargain-
ing: mechanism design and focal points. We extend
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the model of strikes developed in Kennan (1986) and
Forsythe et al. (1991) to an arbitrary finite number of
states. This extension yields nonobvious predictions
of the frequency of disagreement (the strike rate) in
each state, using only the game structure, rational-
ity, and incentive-compatibility constraints. Assuming
interim efficiency allows further predictions. We then
suggest a focal point approach to the problem of equi-
librium selection. Combining these two approaches
yields testable predictions about both deal rates and
payoffs in each state.
3.1. Game and Notation
Two players must agree on how to split a surplus (or
“pie”), a random variable denoted by pi. The informed
player knows the actual size of the pie. The uninformed
player knows that the informed player knows the pie
size. The finite set of states of the world are indexed by
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, and the pie size in state k is pik . With-
out loss of generality, we assume pik > pi j when k > j.
The probability distribution of pie sizes Pr(pik)  pk is
commonly known. The players have a finite amount of
time T, which is commonly known, to reach an agree-
ment. They bargain over the payoff of the uninformed
player, denoted by w, by continuously communicat-
ing their bids. Players cannot commit to a particular
bargaining position. In the case of agreement on an
uniformed player’s payoff w, the informed player gets
pi −w. If no deal is made by time T, both players’ pay-
offs are zero.
3.2. The Direct Bargaining Mechanism
By the revelation principle (Myerson 1979, 1984), for
any Nash equilibrium in the bargaining game, there
exists a payoff-equivalent equilibrium of a simplified
game (“a direct mechanism”) in which the informed
player truthfully reveals the pie size to a neutral “medi-
ator” who determines the payoffs and the probability
of a strike based on that report (Forsythe et al. 1991).
Following FKS, we assume that bargainers negotiate
inscrutably over the set of direct mechanisms of the
following type.
In the direct mechanism, the informed player an-
nounces the true size of the pie, pik . The pie is then
decreased by a known fraction, 1 − γk , which can be
interpreted as the strike probability in state k, leav-
ing an expected pie size of γkpik . We refer to γk as
the deal probability, and to 1 − γk as the strike prob-
ability. The uninformed bargainer receives xk , and the
informed player gets the rest of the pie, γkpik − xk . To
make predictions regarding observed behavior, we rely
on the fact that the payoff xk in the direct mechanism is
tantamount to the expected payoff of the uninformed
player in state k of the bargaining game: xk  γkwk such
that wk is the uninformed payoff conditional on a deal
in state k. A mechanism therefore involves 2K parame-
ters, {γk , xk}Kk1.
3.2.1. Individual Rationality (IR). Individual rational-
ity requires that both players prefer to participate in
the mechanism. Therefore, the IR requirement is that
for all k,
γkpik − xk ≥ 0, (1)
xk ≥ 0. (2)
3.2.2. Incentive Compatibility (IC). A mechanism is
incentive compatible (IC) if it is optimal for the in-
formed player to tell the truth—i.e., her expected payoff
is (weakly) maximized when she announces the true
size of the pie. This requires
γkpik − xk ≥ γjpik − x j , for all k , for all j , k. (3)
The IR and IC conditions together lead to the follow-
ing result.
Lemma 1. If the bargaining mechanism satisfies IR
and IC:
1. Deal rates are monotonically increasing in the pie
size pik .
2. The uninformed player’s payoffs are monotonically
increasing in the pie size.
3. The uninformed player’s payoff is identical for all states
in which the deal probability is 1.
Proof. Incentive compatibility requires
γkpik − xk ≥ γk+1pik − xk+1 ,
γk+1pik+1 − xk+1 ≥ γkpik+1 − xk .
These two equations imply that
(γk+1 − γk)pik+1 ≥ xk+1 − xk ≥ (γk+1 − γk)pik , (4)
and therefore
(γk+1 − γk)(pik+1 − pik) ≥ 0. (5)
By definition, pik+1 ≥ pik , so then γk+1 ≥ γk , and there-
fore the deal rate γk is monotonically increasing in the
pie size (Lemma 1.1). Then, since the difference in deal
rates γk+1 − γk is weakly positive, by the right-hand
side of Equation (4), the difference in the uninformed
player’s payoffs xk+1 − xk is also weakly positive, and
therefore the uninformed player’s payoffs are mono-
tonically increasing in the pie size (Lemma 1.2). Finally,
if the deal rate in state k is 1, by Lemma 1.1, it must
also be 1 in states j > k. Replacing γk  γk+1  1 in both
the right- and left-hand sides of Equation (4), it follows
that xk  xk+1. Therefore, the uninformed player’s pay-
off is identical in states k and k + 1, and, by induction,
in all states j > k. (Lemma 1.3). 
3.2.3. Efficiency. In our setting, a mechanism is effi-
cient (more precisely, is “interim-incentive efficient”;
Holmström and Myerson 1983) if it is Pareto optimal
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for the set of K + 1 agents: the K informed players
in each of the different states k, and the uninformed
player.
Lemma 2. The strike condition: For IR and ICmechanisms,
strikes in state k are ex ante efficient if
pik
pik+1
<
(1−∑kj1 p j)
(1−∑k−1j1 p j)  Pr(pi ≥ pik+1)Pr(pi ≥ pik) . (6)
Proof. See Section A.1 of Appendix A.
The relations between pie size ratios and condi-
tional probabilities of pie size in Equation (6) are called
“strike conditions.” For a given pie size k, strikes are
interim efficient so long as the probability distribution
over pie sizes does not place toomuchweight on state k
relative to the weight on higher states.12
By Lemma 1.1, if there exists a cutoff state, pic , in
which γc  1 (no strikes), then strikes are inefficient
in all states pik such that k ≥ c. Furthermore, as the
uninformed player’s payoff must be the same in all
states where no disagreements occur (Lemma 1.3), this
implies that if strikes are inefficient in more than a sin-
gle state, there exists no equilibrium where both effi-
ciency and payoff equality hold for all states. Thus,
there is a built-in tension between efficiency and equal-
ity under some informational settings.
3.3. Equilibrium Selection Using Focal Points
In theory, the IR and IC constraints limit the scope
of possible bargaining outcomes and predict when
strikes are likely to occur. This is remarkable consider-
ing that the bargaining protocol is unstructured. How-
ever, these conditions do not precisely pin down the
numerical strike rates 1− γk and the equilibrium pay-
offs (conditional on a deal being reached) wk for each
state. There are many such sets of parameter values
that will satisfy IR and IC, and that are equilibrium
outcomes.
To make a more precise prediction, we incorpo-
rate an equilibrium selection approach that relies on
the extensive literature emphasizing the importance
of focal points in bargaining games (Schelling 1960;
Roth 1985; Kristensen and Gärling 1997; Janssen 2001;
Binmore and Samuelson 2006; Janssen 2006; Bardsley
et al. 2010; Isoni et al. 2013, 2014).
Absent other salient features of bargaining, the natu-
ral focal point is an equal split (i.e., wk  pik/2). Indeed,
equal splits often emerge in bargaining experiments
(e.g., Roth and Malouf 1979, Roth and Murnighan
1982).13 Note that equal sharing is also common in
sharecropping contracts (Young and Burke 2001), cor-
porate budget allocations to divisions (Bardolet et al.
2011), bequests to heirs (Menchik 1980, Behrman and
Rosenzweig 2004), and sharing of university invention
royalties (Kotha et al. 2015). Regardless of the source
of equal sharing, here, we simply use this regularity as
a basis for generating precise numerical predictions of
the deal rates.
In practice, we propose that the equilibriumpayoff of
the uninformed player, conditional on a deal, will equal
half of the pie size (wk  pik/2) as long as an equal split
satisfies the IR and IC conditions (Lemma 1), and sub-
ject to efficiency conditions that we discuss below. We
use this premise to calibrate our model and derive two
competing predictions that resolve the tension between
efficiency and equality (discussed in Section 3.2.3) by
either prioritizing the former or the latter.
3.3.1. The Efficient Equilibrium. To prioritize effi-
ciency over equality, we set the deal rate to 1 when-
ever the strike condition (Lemma 2) does not hold (i.e.,
whenever strikes are inefficient). Then, we split the pie
equally given this constraint. Suppose that strikes are
inefficient for all pies that are greater than pic . As dis-
cussed above, this implies that the uninformed player’s
payoff must be the same for all pik ≥ pic (Lemma 1.3).
To yield a clear prediction about the equilibrium unin-
formed payoffs w∗k , we divide the pie equally in lower-
value pie states given this constraint:
w∗k 

pik
2 , ∀pik ≤ pic ,
pic
2 , ∀pik > pic .
(7)
In our experiment, pi takes on values that are the
integer dollar amounts between $1 and $6 with equal
likelihood. It follows numerically that the strike condi-
tion (Lemma 2) holds for pies of size 1 and 2. When
pi  3, the two sides of the inequality are equal, so the
strike rate is indeterminate. When pi ≥ 4, there should
be no strikes. Combining this efficiency constraint with
Lemma 1.3 and the focal principle of equal splitting
implies that an equal split of pi 4 (i.e., the uninformed
player’s payoff is 2) can be an equilibrium, but then the
same amount (2) must also be the equilibrium payoff of
the uninformed player for the larger pie sizes 5 and 6.
The assumption of efficiency, the strike condition
(Equation (6)), and the use of focal payoffs (Equa-
tion (7)) enable us to pin down the exact deal rates for
all pie sizes. We first set γ4  γ5  γ6  1, as required
by the strike condition when pie sizes are uniformly
distributed over {$1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The IC conditions and
the assumption of efficiency require that the left-hand
side of Equation (4) holds at equality, because raising
the deal rate in any state weakly improves the payoffs
of both players.14 Therefore, efficiency requires that
(γk+1 − γk)pik+1  xk+1 − xk , ∀ k. (8)
Noting again that the uninformed player’s payoff in
each state xk in the direct bargaining mechanism is
equal to the payoff in case of a deal times the strike rate,
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we fix xk  γk( 12pik) for all k < 4, and xk  2 for all k ≥ 4
as required by the efficiency condition, and substitute
these expressions into Equation (8) to obtain
γk 
(1/2)pik+1
pik+1 − (1/2)pik γk+1 , ∀ k < 4,
γk  1, ∀ k ≥ 4.
(9)
Solving this set of equations yields the prediction that
(γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , γ4 , γ5 , γ6) ( 25 , 35 , 45 , 1, 1, 1). (10)
We can also use Equation (8) to show that under cer-
tain conditions, which aremet by both of our candidate
equilibria, deal rates are linear in the pie size.
Remark 1. If the difference between pie sizes pik+1 − pik
is constant, for all k, and the uninformed player’s pay-
off, conditional on a deal, is equal to half the pie size
(so that xk  12γkpik), then γk − γk−1  γk+1 − γk ; that is,
the change in deal rates is constant.
The proof is in Section A.2 of the appendix.
3.3.2. The Equal Split Equilibrium. As discussed in
Section 3.2.3, some efficiency must be sacrificed to
achieve equality for every pie size. In the equal split
equilibrium, we first impose equal splits and only then
maximize efficiency given this constraint:
w∗k 
pik
2 . (11)
As the deal rates are increasing with the pie size
(Lemma 1.1), and as the uninformed payoff must
be identical in all states where there are no strikes
(Lemma 1.3), full equality implies that efficiency (i.e.,
no strikes) can only be achieved in the largest pie. Thus,
to pin down exact numerical predictions of deal rates
in the equal equilibrium, we set γ6  1. Then, we again
make use of Equation (8) to calculate deal rates:
γk 
(1/2)pik+1
pik+1 − (1/2)pik γk+1 , ∀ k < 6,
γk  1, k  6.
(12)
Solving this set of equations yields the prediction
that
(γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , γ4 , γ5 , γ6) ( 27 , 37 , 47 , 57 , 67 , 1). (13)
4. Experiment
In this section, we present a novel experimental
paradigm of dynamic bargaining, which allows both
parties to communicate offers whenever they please,
while keeping their behavior tractable.
4.1. Design
Our design is a continuous-time bargaining game with
one-sided private information. At the start of each
session, participants were randomly divided into two
equally sized type groups: informed and uninformed.
The types were fixed for the session’s 120 bargaining
round. Each round had the following steps:
Step 1. Each player was randomly matched with a
partner from the other group in a stranger protocol (to
prevent sequential effects such as reputation building).
Step 2. In each game, an integer pie size, pi ∈ {$1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6}, was drawn from a commonly known discrete
uniform distribution:
Pr(pik) 16 , ∀pi ∈ {$1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Step 3. The informed player was told the true value
of pi for that round.
Step 4. Each pair bargained over the uninformed
player’s payoff, denoted by w. Players communicated
their monetary offers, in multiples of $0.2,15 using
mouse clicks on a graphical interface thatwas designed
for this purpose by z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007)16
(see Figure 1). The offer values were between $0 and $6.
Step 5. During the first two seconds of bargaining,
both players fixed their initial offers, without seeing the
offers of their partner (see Figure 1(a)). The initial cur-
sor location (i.e., before the first click) was randomized.
Step 6. Once the initial offers were set, players bar-
gained continuously for 10 seconds using mouse clicks
(see Figure 1(b)).17
Step 7. When players’ positions matched each other,
visual feedback was given to both of them in the form
of a vertical stripe connecting their offer lines (see Fig-
ure 1(c)). If none of the players changed their position
for the next 1.5 seconds following the offer-match feed-
back, a deal was made (i.e., the deal is closed 1.5 sec-
onds after the initial match). Thus, to make a deal,
the latest time in which players’ bids could match was
t  8.5 seconds.
Step 8. If no deal had been made within 10 seconds
of bargaining, both players’ payoffs from that round
were $0.
Step 9. After each game, both players were told their
payoffs and the actual pie size, for five seconds (see
Figure 1(d)).
4.2. Methods
We conducted eight experimental sessions, five in
the Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL)
at Caltech and three in the California Social Science
Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL) at UCLA. There
were a total of N  110 subjects (mean age 21.3,
SD 2.4; 47 females (see Appendix B for detailed ses-
sion information)). In the beginning of each session,
subjects were randomly assigned to isolated computer
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Figure 1. (Color online) Bargaining Interface
(a)
Pie size is $4
Please place your initial offer
Pie size is $4
Pie size is $4
Please place your offer
Please place your offer
Time: 6 sec
(c)
Your profit is $2.4
Pie size was $4
Time: 3 sec
(b)
(d)
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
Notes. (a) Initial offer screen: in the first two seconds of bargaining, players set their initial position, oblivious to the initial position of their
partner. The pie size at the top left corner appears only for the informed type. (b) Players communicate their offers using mouse click on
the interface. (c) When demands match, feedback in the form of a green vertical stripe appears on the screen. If no changes are made in the
following 1.5 seconds, a deal is made. (d) Following the game, both players are notified regarding their payoffs and the pie size.
workstations and were handed printed versions of the
instructions (see Appendix D). The instructions were
also read aloud by the experimenter (who was the
same person in all sessions). All of the participants
completed a short quiz to check their understanding of
the task. Subjects played 15 practice rounds to become
familiar with the game and the interactive interface
before the actual play of 120 rounds. Participants’ pay-
offs were based on their profits in a randomly chosen
15% of the rounds, plus a show-up fee of $5. Each
session lasted between 70 and 90 minutes (including
check-in, reading of instructions, experimental task,
and payment). The data consist of each subject’s bar-
gaining positions in each game and the outcomes of
120 rounds.18
5. Experimental Results
5.1. Main Findings
Below, we report our main findings. Supporting statis-
tical analyses and hypothesis tests are contained in the
subsequent two sections. We observed the following
empirical regularities:
Result 1. Deal rates and payoffs are increasing with the
pie size.
The mean deal rates and payoffs, conditional on a
deal being reached, for each pie amount are summa-
rized in Table 1 and Figure 2(a). While the probability
of disagreement decreased with the pie size, the mean
amount of surplus lost because of strikes (Table 1) was
positively correlated with the pie, as relatively small
amounts of money are lost when strikes occur in small
pie games. However, as a fraction of the total available
surplus, the loss is greatest in the low-pie-size games,
and smallest in the high-pie-size games. In addition,
the difference between uninformed and informed pay-
offs is larger in high-pie-size games.
Result 2. When the pie is small or medium (pi ≤ $4), the
modes of the uninformed players’ payoffs distribution are
half of the pie; in large-pie games (pi > $4) the modes are $2
and there are local maxima at the half of the pie.
The distributions of uninformed players’ payoffs are
in Figure 3. The mean payoffs (conditional on a deal
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Table 1. Average Payoffs and Deal Rates by Pie Size
Pie size 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean
Informed 0.37 0.95 1.56 2.23 3.07 3.87 2.01
payoff (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Uninformed 0.63 1.05 1.44 1.77 1.93 2.13 1.49
payoff (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Deal rate 0.42 0.48 0.54 0.69 0.73 0.81 0.61
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Surplus loss 0.58 1.04 1.39 1.25 1.36 1.16 1.13
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Information −0.11 −0.05 0.05 0.31 0.83 1.39 0.40
valuea (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.10)
Notes. Averages are calculated for deal games only. Means and stan-
dard errors are calculated by treating each session’s mean as a single
observation. Standard errors in parentheses.
aInformation value  the mean difference between the informed
and uninformed payoffs.
being reached) are in Figure 2(b). Overall, 82% of the
payoffs, conditional on a deal being reached, match
values that are halves of one of the six possible pies.19
Equal splits are the most prevalent outcomes (51.4%)
of small- and medium-pie games (pi ≤ 4), where the
predicted payoffs of the efficient and equal equilib-
ria coincide (Figure 3, top two rows). In large-pie
Figure 2. (Color online) Deal Rates and Mean Payoffs
Across Pie Sizes
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Note. Standard errors are calculated at the session level.
games (pi ≥ 5), equality and efficiency are in discord.
The payoff distributions of these games (Figure 3, bot-
tom row) have modes at the efficient (but unequal)
uninformed payoff of 2 (31% of payoffs), and local
maxima (19% of payoffs) at the equal-split (but inef-
ficient) payoffs of 2.5 (when pi  5, 17% of payoffs)
and 3 (when pi  6, 20% of payoffs). Thus, about half
of the bargaining payoffs match one of the two equi-
libria. These results confirm that equality concerns did
influence bargaining outcomes, generalizing the exper-
imental literature studying complete information bar-
gaining (Nydegger and Owen 1974, Roth and Malouf
1979) and ultimatum bargaining with private informa-
tion (Mitzkewitz and Nagel 1993) to an unstructured
environment with informational asymmetry.
Result 3. The informed players’ offers increase, and the
uninformed players’ demands decrease with time (within a
trial).
Result 3 is illustrated by the plots of mean bargaining
positions shown in Figure 4. In Section 6, we explore
how the process of bargaining affects outcomes.
Result 4. Most deals are made close to the deadline.
More than half of the deals were made in the last two
seconds of bargaining. Figure 5 shows the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of deals over time, which
sharply increased as the deadline approached for all
pies.20 Generally, deals were reached sooner when the
pie was larger. This result is in line with the “dead-
line effect” reported in previous studies of unstruc-
tured bargainingwith full information (Roth et al. 1988,
Gächter and Riedl 2005).
5.2. Comparison with Theoretical Predictions
We now turn to testing the predictions derived from
the bargaining theory. For convenience, we refer to the
informed and uninformed players’ bargaining posi-
tions as “offers” and “demands,” respectively. We first
use nonparametric statistics on the pooled data to test
our theoretical predictions for both deal rates and pay-
offs. We then use linear regressions that include con-
trols for the location of the experiment, the session, and
the experience of the subjects, to compare our results
with the focal equilibrium predictions from Section 3.3.
5.2.1. Nonparametric Hypothesis Tests on the Pooled
Data. Our analysis of the direct bargainingmechanism
predicts that deal rates will be monotonically increas-
ing in the pie size. Table 1 and Figure 2(a) suggest that
deal rates rise smoothly with increasing pie size, in line
with the qualitative prediction. Hypothesis tests on the
pooled experimental data (treating each game between
two players as an observation) are also consistent with
the model’s predictions. A nonparametric Wilcoxon-
type test for trend (Cuzick 1985) in deal rates over pie
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Figure 3. (Color online) Uninformed Player’s Payoff Relative Frequencies (Deal Games, Binned in a $0.25 Resolution)
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Note. The green bar locates the half of the pie in each distribution.
sizes strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no trend
(z  23.24, p < 0.001, two-sided).
The next prediction resulting from Lemma 1 is that
the uninformed players’ payoffs will be monotonically
increasing in the pie size, conditional on a deal being
Figure 4. (Color online) Mean Bargaining Position for All Pie Sizes (All Rounds Pooled)
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reached. A nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis test (with
adjustments for ties) rejects thenull hypothesis of equal-
ity of the distributions of the uninformed players’ pay-
offs in each pie size (χ2(5)  1,800.162, p < 0.001, two-
sided). Consistent with Lemma 1, a nonparametric
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Figure 5. (Color online) Cumulative Distribution of Deal
Times by Pie Size
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Note. Median deal times are marked by an asterisk.
Wilcoxon-type test rejects the null hypothesis of no
trend in payoffs conditional on the pie size (z  41.11,
p < 0.001, two-sided).
Lemma 1 also predicts that the uninformed player’s
payoff will be identical for all states in which the deal
probability is 1. The efficient equilibrium prediction is
that the deal probability will be 1 in pie sizes 4 and
greater, while the equal-split equilibrium gives deal
rates equal to 1 in pie size 6 only. In contrast to the
predictions of both equilibria, strikes are common in
all pie sizes (see Table 1 and Figure 2(a)) and occur
even at the largest pie size of 6 (about 19%, averag-
ing over eight sessions; see Table 1). A nonparametric
Kruskal–Wallis test for equality of payoff distributions
(with corrections for ties) rejects the null hypothesis
that the mean payoffs to the uninformed player, con-
ditional on a deal, are equal in pie sizes 4, 5, and 6
(χ2(2) 111.503, p < 0.001, two-sided).
5.2.2. Regression Analyses. In Section 3.3, we relied
on the assumption that players coordinate on focal pay-
offs to derive precise equilibrium predictions about
deal rates and payoffs. The “efficient” equilibrium pre-
dicts a deal rate of 25 in pie size 1, increasing by
1
5 per
pie unit up to pie size 4, and then a deal rate of 1 when
the pie is greater than or are equal to 4. The “equal
split” equilibrium predicts a deal rate of 27 when the pie
equals 1, increasing by 17 per unit, up to 1 in pie size 6.
We test these predictions using linear regressions,
where the dependent variable is whether a deal was
reached in a given bargaining game, as follows:
yiust  α0 + α1piiust + α2diust(piiust − 4)+Xiustβ+ iust.
Here, yiust equals 1 if a deal was reached in the bar-
gaining round between informed player i and unin-
formed player u in session s and period t, and 0
otherwise.21 The predictions of the two models are
nested via the inclusion of the spline term diust(piiust−4),
where diust is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if
piiust≥4, and 0 otherwise; and the term (piiust−4) gener-
ates a knot at pie size 4 (see Greene 2003, pp. 121–122).
The vector Xiust contains control variables. With this
specification, the equal split equilibrium prediction is
(α0 , α1 , α2)  ( 17 , 17 ,0), where the efficient equilibrium
prediction is (α0 , α1 , α2)( 15 , 15 ,− 15 ).
Table 2 reports regression results. All models include
standard errors clustered at the session level, to
account for dependence in residuals within a partic-
ular session.22 Model A gives the base results from
the regression of deal on pie size and the spline
term, using pooled data from all sessions. Models B
includes session controls, and Model C uses controls
at the level of individual subject pairs (the smallest
grouping available). Model D drops these controls
and adds an indicator term controlling for the session
location (Caltech=1 or UCLA=0), as well as an indi-
cator term for the last 60 rounds of the experiment
(rounds 61–120), to capture the effect of experience.
Model E adds interactions between the location and
experience terms and the pie and spline terms.Model F
drops the Caltech indicator and adds session-level con-
trols. Model G (which is discussed in detail in the next
section) adds the initial bargaining positions of the
players as covariates.
In all models, the coefficient on pie size is signifi-
cantly positive, indicating an 8.0% to 9.5% increase in
deal probability for a 1 unit increase in the pie size.
This estimate is robust to controlling for location and
experience, and to the inclusion of session or pair-level
controls (see Models B–E of Table 2). Thus, consistent
with the predictions derived from the IC conditions in
Lemma 1, we find that deal rates increase in the pie
size. However, the slope coefficient on the pie size is
smaller than predicted by either equilibrium model,
with the upper bound for the 95% confidence inter-
val of the coefficient estimate on pie size (about 0.11)
lower than the minimum prediction of either model
( 17 or approximately 0.14 for the equal-split model, or1
5 for the efficient equilibrium). The constant term from
the regression in Model A of Table 2 (approximately
0.28) is larger than predicted by either model, but is
closer to the prediction of the equal split model ( 15 ).
The coefficient on the spline term for pie sizes 4 and
above is not significantly different from 0 in any of
the models, and F-tests of the full model specifications
consistently reject both models.23 We do not find a sta-
tistically significant difference in deal rates between the
subject populations at UCLA and Caltech.
In a similar fashion, we used linear regressions to test
the focal-split predictions about payoffs conditional on
the players reaching a deal. The efficient equilibrium
predicts equal splits when the pie is small, and that
the uninformed player’s conditional payoff will be 2
when the pie is 4 or greater. The equal-split equilibrium
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Table 2. Linear Regressions—Predictors of Deals
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
Pie 0.0940∗∗∗ 0.0935∗∗∗ 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.0938∗∗∗ 0.0951∗∗∗ 0.0868∗∗∗ 0.0802∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0170) (0.0129) (0.0108)
Spline at pie 4 −0.0284 −0.0262 −0.0200 −0.0276 −0.0425 −0.0246 −0.0171
(0.0263) (0.0270) (0.0278) (0.0270) (0.0454) (0.0298) (0.0263)
Caltech 0.0710 0.1067
(0.0425) (0.1211)
Rounds 61–120 0.0347∗ −0.0049 −0.0084 −0.0041
(0.0154) (0.0495) (0.0471) (0.0477)
Caltech×Pie −0.0138
(0.0309)
Caltech×Spline 0.0260
(0.0505)
Rd.61–120×Pie 0.0106 0.0126 0.0145
(0.0151) (0.0140) (0.0132)
Rd.61–120×Spline 0.0048 −0.0025 −0.0101
(0.0203) (0.0174) (0.0149)
Initial demand −0.0546∗∗∗
(0.0103)
Initial offer 0.0257
(0.0305)
Constant 0.2805∗∗∗ 0.2812∗∗∗ 0.2902∗∗∗ 0.2309∗∗∗ 0.2332∗∗∗ 0.2861∗∗∗ 0.4402∗∗∗
(0.0612) (0.0434) (0.0439) (0.0497) (0.0439) (0.0279) (0.0531)
Observations 6,432 6,432 6,432 6,432 6,432 6,432 6,432
AIC 8,543.859 8,400.798 7,106.364 8,502.368 8,501.844 8,395.001 8,278.694
BIC 8,564.166 8,414.336 7,119.902 8,536.213 8,549.228 8,428.847 8,326.077
Session controls No Yes No No No Yes Yes
Pair controls No No Yes No No No No
Notes. Coef., coefficient; SE, standard errors. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the session level.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
assumes a 50/50 split for all pie sizes. We test these
predictions via linear regressions that include a spline
term, of the form
wiust  α0 + α1piiust + α2diust(piiust − 4)+Xiustβ+ iust ,
where wiust represents the payoff, conditional on a deal
being reached, to uninformed player u, paired with
informed player i, in session s and period t. The equal-
split equilibrium prediction is (α0 , α1 , α2)  ( 12 , 12 , 0), as
the coefficient on the spline term is 0. The efficient equi-
librium prediction is (α0 , α1 , α2)  ( 12 , 12 ,− 12 ), with the− 12 coefficient on the spline term capturing the predic-
tion that uninformed payoffs will be constant at pie
sizes 4 and higher.
The regression results are shown in Table 3, with the
same model specifications as in Table 2. As above, the
results are robust to the inclusion of controls for either
the session or for subject pairs (Models A–C). The coef-
ficient on the pie size is positive and statistically signifi-
cant, consistentwith the prediction derived from the IC
conditions that uninformed payoffs increase with the
pie size. In line with the efficient equilibrium predic-
tion (of a constant uninformed payoff when the pie is
larger than 4), the coefficient of the spline term is nega-
tive and significant. However, these analyses only par-
tially support the efficient equilibriumhypothesis: both
the slope term (between 0.34 and about 0.37 in Mod-
els A–F) and the intercept term (which ranges from
0.23 to 0.34 in Models A–F) are lower than the efficient
equilibrium predictions that both terms will equal 0.5.
The spline coefficient does not fully offset the pie coeffi-
cient when the pie is large. Formally, both equilibrium
models are rejected by an F-test, as is the equal-split
equilibrium prediction that the marginal effect of pie
size is zero in high pie sizes (e.g., in Model A, F(1, 7)
598.48, p < 0.0001). We also find a small effect of loca-
tion when interacted with pie size (Model C).
With 120 rounds of play, our experiment design
allows us to investigating whether behavior con-
verges to the predicted equilibria as participants gain
experience. Models B–E in Tables 2 and 3 include
an indicator for the second half of the experiment
(rounds 61–120) as a proxy for experience. We find a
small effect of experience on deal rates (the coefficient
on rounds 61–120 was positive and marginally signif-
icant (Table 2, Model B)) as well as uninformed pay-
offs (the coefficient on rounds 61–120 is positive and
significant in Model B of Table 3, indicating that the
uninformed player earns about $0.10 more per game
in the second half of the experiment). The interaction
term of rounds 61–120 and pie size is also marginally
significant in Model E, suggesting some convergence
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Table 3. Linear Regressions—Predictors of Uninformed Payoffs Conditional on Deal
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
Pie 0.3708∗∗∗ 0.3718∗∗∗ 0.3603∗∗∗ 0.3697∗∗∗ 0.3428∗∗∗ 0.3595∗∗∗ 0.2589∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0098) (0.0152) (0.0106) (0.0208) (0.0153) (0.0232)
Spline at pie 4 −0.2252∗∗∗ −0.2230∗∗∗ −0.2196∗∗∗ −0.2237∗∗∗ −0.2540∗∗∗ −0.2200∗∗∗ −0.1527∗∗∗
(0.0234) (0.0215) (0.0209) (0.0232) (0.0333) (0.0228) (0.0199)
Caltech 0.0462 −0.1286
(0.0714) (0.1103)
Rounds 61–120 0.1048∗∗ 0.0422 0.0258 −0.0089
(0.0397) (0.0237) (0.0231) (0.0311)
Caltech×Pie 0.0355∗
(0.0187)
Caltech×Spline 0.0583
(0.0467)
Rd.61–120×Pie 0.0144 0.0212 0.0359∗
(0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0158)
Rd.61-120×Spline 0.0126 −0.0035 −0.0208
(0.0366) (0.0389) (0.0368)
Initial demand 0.0345∗
(0.0147)
Initial offer 0.3968∗∗∗
(0.0750)
Constant 0.3042∗∗∗ 0.2990∗∗∗ 0.3416∗∗∗ 0.2304∗ 0.3549∗∗ 0.2894∗∗∗ 0.1100∗∗
(0.0572) (0.0440) (0.0577) (0.0977) (0.1037) (0.0483) (0.0349)
Observations 3,819 3,819 3,819 3,819 3,819 3,819 3,819
AIC 6,254.813 6,156.995 4,561.273 6,217.291 6,184.654 6,122.826 4,869.375
BIC 6,273.557 6,169.491 4,573.769 6,248.530 6,228.389 6,154.065 4,913.109
Session controls No Yes No No No Yes Yes
Pair controls No No Yes No No No No
Notes. Coef., coefficient; SE, standard errors. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the session level.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
toward the focal equilibria predictions. However, even
in the final rounds, strikes are common in all pie sizes.24
We interpret this as evidence that additional factors
drive bargaining outcomes beyond the pie size.
In summary, we find strong support for theoreti-
cal predictions derived from incentive and rationality
(or participation) constraints from mechanism design,
while predictions derived from efficiency considera-
tions fare less well. Both deal rates and payoffs increase
with the pie size, as predicted by Lemma 1. Disagree-
ment rates are qualitatively more consistent with the
equal-split equilibrium, though deal rates are generally
higher in low pie sizes than our equilibrium predic-
tions, and both deal rates and payoffs are less respon-
sive to changes in the pie sizes than predicted by our
models.25 Interestingly, there is evidence of a lessened
sensitivity of the uninformed player’s payoffs to the pie
size in high pie sizes (pi ≥ 4), which is qualitatively con-
sistent with our efficient equilibrium model. However,
themagnitude of this change is lower than predicted by
themodel.
Our results demonstrate that theoretical predic-
tions, derived from mechanism design models that
assume risk-neutral, selfish players, and focal-point–
based equilibrium selection, can take us a long way,
even in unstructured settings, but also reveal the lim-
itations of this approach. Bargaining outcomes quali-
tatively match a mix of two equilibrium patterns, and
some game outcomes match neither equilibria. Fur-
thermore, theoretical predictions critically depend on
the pie size—which is private information that would
typically be unobservable to econometricians in field
data. In the next section, we use bargaining process
data to overcome some of these limitations.
6. Using Process Data to Understand
Disagreements
In counterpoint to the process-free approach of mech-
anism design, a large experimental literature in psy-
chology and economics studies the role of procedu-
ral factors in determining bargaining outcomes. In this
section, we explore how bargaining process affects
outcomes.
6.1. The Influence of Bargaining Positions on
Bargaining Outcomes
Many experimental studies have found that initial
demands and offers can influence bargaining outcomes
(Chertkoff and Conley 1967, Yukl 1974b, Gächter and
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Figure 6. Uninformed Player’s Initial Demands (Pooled
Across All Games, Binned in a $0.25 Resolution)
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Riedl 2005, Karagözoğlu and Riedl 2015). Some negoti-
ation researchers view these initial demands as reflect-
ing players’ aspirational payoffs—i.e., the most desir-
able payoffs that they can achieve, according to their
beliefs (Yukl 1974a, White and Neale 1994, Kristensen
and Gärling 1997, Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001, Van
Poucke and Buelens 2002). Motivated by this research,
we investigated the relationship between initial bar-
gaining positions and outcomes in our task.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the uninformed
players’ initial bargaining positions. The mode of the
distribution (pooled across all pie sizes) was three
(31%)—matching the highest possible equal equilib-
rium payoff.26 An additional local maxima at two
(19%) matched the highest possible payoff in the effi-
cient equilibrium. Thus, the majority of the unin-
formed players’ initial demands exactly match their
maximal payoffs in either the efficient or equal equilib-
ria, with a greater proportion matching the equal-split
equilibrium.
In Model G of both Tables 2 and 3, we report re-
sults from regressions that add the initial offer of the
informed player and the initial demand of the unin-
formed player to the regression models reported in
Section 5.2. We examine the effects of initial offers
on deals (Table 2) and on payoffs conditional on a
deal being reached (Table 3). We find a significant and
economically meaningful effect of initial demands by
the uninformed player on the probability of a deal,
such that a $1 increase in initial demands reduced the
probability of a deal by about 4.6%. However, it also
led to an increase in the uninformed player’s condi-
tional payoff of $0.035, though this increase is only
marginally statistically significant. The initial offer of
the informed player is not a statistically significant pre-
dictor of whether deals are reached, but it strongly
predicts the uninformed player’s payoff conditional on
a deal being reached, above and beyond the pie size.
This effect is economically large: a $1 increase in the
initial offer is predicted to result in a $0.397 increase in
the payoff of the uninformed player when controlling
for the size of the pie.27
These results show that the process of bargaining
plays an important role in determining whether a deal
is reached, beyond the actual realization of the pie size.
As private information might be unobservable to an
econometrician in more natural settings, this finding
has important practical implications, which we explore
further in the following sections.
6.2. Predicting Disagreements Using
Bargaining Process Data
Our unstructured paradigm records, in addition to ini-
tial demands and offers, a large amount of bargaining
process data that may be used to predict disagree-
ments before the deadline has arrived. For example,
suppose that at the five-second mark, neither player
has changed her offer for more than three seconds.
This mutual stubbornness might be associated with an
eventual strike. We consider a large number of such
candidate observable features in search of a small set
that is predictive, using cross-validation (Stone 1974) to
control for overfitting. This machine learning approach
has been used in many applications in computer sci-
ence and neuroscience, and is beginning to be more
widely used in economics (Krajbich et al. 2009, Belloni
et al. 2012, Einav and Levin 2014, Varian 2014, Smith
et al. 2014, Mullainathan and Spiess 2017, Bajari et al.
2015) and other social sciences (Dzyabura and Hauser
2011, Youyou et al. 2015, Yarkoni and Westfall 2017,
Nave et al. 2018).
One possibility is that there is little predictive infor-
mation in such features, after controlling for overfit-
ting. Indeed, if players know what the predictive fea-
tures are, they should alter their behavior to avoid
costly disagreements, erasing the features’ predictive
power.28 Another possibility is that there are numer-
ous small influences on disagreement that the players
simply do not notice and that may be picked up by our
modeling.
We chose 34 behavioral features recorded during
bargaining. Examples of features are the current differ-
ence between the offer and demand, the time since the
last position change, and an indicator denoting which
of the players had changed his or her position in the
game first. The full list is in Appendix C). For each of
the eight experimental sessions, we trained a model
to classify trials into disagreements or deals, using the
data of the remaining seven sessions, by estimating a
logistic regression with a least absolute shrinkage and
selection operator (LASSO) penalty (Tibshirani 1996).29
By applying these trained models, we then made out-
of-sample predictions of the binary bargaining out-
comes for each of the experimental sessions.
As noted earlier, the pie size is a strong predictor of
disagreements. The challenges for our machine learn-
ing approach are twofold. First, we investigate whether
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process features have predictive power similar to the
pie size when studied alone. In other words, we test
whether process data allow for predicting bargaining
outcomes when the pie size, which is private infor-
mation, is treated as if it were unobservable. Second,
we investigate whether process features add predictive
power when used together with the pie size.
To assess the predictive power of process data, we
estimated three strike prediction models at eight dif-
ferent points in the bargaining process, separated by
one-second intervals (i.e., 1, 2, . . . , 8 seconds after bar-
gaining started). One model relies only on the pie
size,30 the second uses only process features, and the
third uses both pie size and process features.31 For
each time stamp, predictions were carried out using
the following nested cross-validation procedure: For
each of the eight sessions, we trained a linear model
to predict the outcome (a deal or a strike), by fitting
a logistic LASSO regression using the seven other ses-
sions. The tuning parameter, λ, was optimized via ten-
fold cross-validation,32 performed within each training
set.33 Finally, using that trained model, we conducted
out-of-sample predictions for the holdout sessions.
We evaluate our results using “receiver operating
characteristic” (ROC) curves (Hanley andMcNeil 1982,
Bradley 1997). ROC is a standard tool in signal detec-
tion theory, used for quantifying the performance of
a binary classifier under different trade-offs between
type I and type II errors. A familiar example is a house-
hold smoke alarm: the alarm can be tuned to be very
sensitive, indicating a fire when a burnt toast creates
too much smoke, or it can be tuned to be insensitive,
ignoring the smoke from burnt toast but also possibly
ignoring smoke from a genuine fire caused by a half-
lit cigar accidentally knocked onto a copy of the Daily
Prophet newspaper.
The use of an ROC curve reflects the fact that one can
always create more true positives (in our example pre-
dicting more strikes), but doing so comes at the cost of
then predicting more false positives (predicting strikes
that do not happen). When using these methods, one
would often like to know the trade-off between cor-
rectly detecting true positives more accurately and also
reducing the probability of false positives. A curve
mapping all pairs of true and false positive levels there-
fore allows for choosing an optimal policy for every
given relative cost of the two types of errors.
To calculate the ROC,we subjected the out-of-sample
predicted deal probabilities (calculated by applying
the estimated logistic LASSO regression weights to
the out-of-sample process data) to different decision
thresholds—i.e., for a decision threshold τ ∈ [0, 1], all
predicted values less than τ were classified as “strike,”
whereas predicted values greater than or equal to τ
were classified as “deal.”34 Every point on the ROC,
therefore, represents a decision threshold, such that its
coordinates represent the empirical false positive and
true positive rates, calculated using the threshold.
For a random classifier, the true positive and false
positive rates are identical (the 45-degree line in Fig-
ure 7). A good classifier increases the true positive rate
(moving up on the y axis) and also decreases the false
positive rate (moving left on the x axis). The difference
between the ROC and the 45-degree line, in the upper-
left direction, also known as the “area under the curve”
(AUC; Bradley 1997) is an index of how well the classi-
fier does.35
The ROC analysis shows that process data do better
than random for every time stamp (for illustration, see
Figures 7(a)–(c)). Furthermore, the AUC of the classi-
fier that uses solely process features is similar to the
AUC of a classifier using solely the pie size, for times
greater than two seconds into the bargaining process
(see Figure 7(d)). Combining of pie size and process
features improves accuracy further: a classifier using
both pie size and process data outperforms the classi-
fier using the pie size alone for every time stamp in the
bargaining process (Figure 7(d)). These results show
that the process of bargaining itself can lead to bargain-
ing failures, above and beyond the pie size alone.36
6.3. Which Bargaining Process Features
Predict Disagreements?
To further investigate which behavioral process fea-
tures predict disagreements, we used a “post-LASSO”
procedure (Belloni and Chernozhukov 2013, Belloni
et al. 2012).37 Figure 8 summarizes the marginal effects
of the most predictive process features (z-scored for
every time point), such that an “interaction” repre-
sents a multiplication of two variables. The marginal
effects of all process features investigated are reported
in Appendix C.
Not surprisingly, the most predictive process fea-
tures are the current informed player’s offer (positively
associated with a deal) and the current difference
between the players’ bargaining positions (positively
associated with a strike). More surprisingly, the play-
ers’ initial bargaining positions contain predictive
information regarding the chance of reaching a deal,
even as the deadline approaches, and even after con-
trolling for current offers. The informed player’s initial
offer is positively associated with a chance of a deal,
and the effect is moderated by the uninformed player’s
initial demand, as implied by a negative interaction
between the two factors. Thus, initial offers are mostly
associated with deals when the initial demands are
low. There was also an intriguing negative interaction
between the initial and current offers: the current offer
becomes particularly associated with a deal when the
initial offer is low. This result is consistent with an idea
from negotiation research, that initial offers serve as
reference points in bargaining. When initial offers are
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Figure 7. (Color online) Strike Prediction Using Bargaining Process Data
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Notes. (a–c) Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) for predicting disagreements, two and seven seconds into the bargaining game. The
dashed lines represent the false and true positive rates of a random classifier. (d) Area under the curve (AUC) of disagreements classifiers
using process data, pie size, and the two combined. Note that the classifier’s input included only trials that were still in progress (when a deal
has not yet been achieved), and excluded trials in which the offers and demand were equal at the relevant time stamp.
low, they make later, more generous offers seem more
attractive, and increase the chances of a deal (Galinsky
and Mussweiler 2001).
Our analyses further revealed a rich set of behavioral
features that reliablypredicteddisagreements through-
out the bargaining process, even after controlling for
the current bargaining positions (see Appendix C for
all marginal effects). While these findings do not allow
causal inference, and therefore should be interpreted
with caution, they provide an avenue for further inves-
tigations of how bargaining outcomes are related to
bargaining processes characteristics. For example, an
increased activity on the informed player side (i.e.,
many position changes) is a precursor of an upcoming
deal, as early as two seconds into the bargaining pro-
cess. The use of focal points (i.e., offers and demands
that match halves of the integer pies) was positively
associated with an upcoming deal, unless both players’
positions match different focal points, as implied by a
negative marginal interaction effect. This finding sug-
gests that disagreements may arise as a result of a coor-
dination failure when players use different focal points
to communicate their claims, in line with Roth’s focal
theory of bargaining (Roth 1985).38
7. Conclusion
Much of the recent literature on bargaining has studied
structured bargaining. We reiterate here our motiva-
tions for studying unstructured bargaining in dynamic
and uncertain environments. First, much real-world
bargaining is unstructured and involves private infor-
mation; unstructured bargaining generates process
data that can be used to predict strikes ahead of time;
and theory can be used to make precise predictions
even with minimal structure.
In this paper, we study dynamic unstructured bar-
gaining in a game with one-sided private information.
We combine mechanism design theory with an equi-
librium selection approach that builds on a well-
documented empirical regularity: the appeal of an
equal split as a bargaining focal point. Our approach
is agnostic regarding the driving force behind equal
splits. A large theoretical literature attempts to address
the question of why equal splits are focal; equal splits
might result, for example, from inequality aversion,
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Figure 8. (Color online) Bargaining Process Features Selected by the Classifier for Outcome Prediction (Deal 1) and Their
Estimated Marginal Effects
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concerns about fairness, or social norms. Another
explanation might be lying aversion (Gneezy et al.
2013), and our experiment’s design, which incorpo-
rates feedback after each round of bargaining, may
encourage truthful revelation. However, our design
also involves random, anonymous rematching of bar-
gaining partners after each game, which might be
expected to act in the opposite direction.
Our theoretical model predicts that the rate of bar-
gaining failures will be decreasing in the pie size. The
additional assumption of interim incentive efficiency
implies that the distribution of surplus will favor the
informed player when the pie size crosses a thresh-
old. We find support for both of these hypotheses in
our data. In addition, we also observe an interesting
departure from the “efficient” benchmark: bargaining
failures arise even at the highest pie levels and even
after many rounds of play, and the surplus is divided
equally in many high-stakes games, in contrast to the
efficient equilibrium prediction.
In theory, the uninformed players’ payoffs must be
identical in all pies where no disagreements occur, gen-
erating an inherent trade-off between efficiency and
equality. We propose two ways to resolve this ten-
sion, by either favoring efficiency and dividing the
pie equally given the efficiency constraint (“efficient”
equilibrium) or by imposing equal splits and only
thenmaximizing efficiency (“equal split” equilibrium).
While the modes of the distributions of the informed
players’ final offers more closely match the efficient
equilibrium, deal rates qualitatively match the predic-
tion of the equal split equilibrium. Further, the unin-
formed players’ initial offers reflect aspirations of equal
splits in the largest pie, suggesting that some unin-
formed players might use disagreements as a means to
impose equal splits despite the loss of efficiency.
Although our results show that theoretical predic-
tions based on the assumption of self-interest go a long
way even in an unstructured setting, they also high-
light their limitations. The data qualitatively match the
mix of the two equilibria patterns, but some games
do not match either. Further, the theoretical prediction
depends on the realization of the pie size, which is pri-
vate information and thereforemight not be observable
in many realistic circumstances. We propose overcom-
ing this obstacle by analyzing bargaining process data.
Our machine learning approach shows that process
data is incrementally informative for predicting strikes
when the pie size is included in the model, and is
as informative as knowing the pie size when the lat-
ter is unobservable (before the deadline has arrived).
These results suggest that some bargaining failures
may result from process “mistakes” that could have
been avoided if players had behaved differently. Pro-
cess data may be used to avert strikes and other ineffi-
cient disagreements by offering “course corrections” in
the bargaining process. Bargaining process data could
potentially be much richer, and therefore substantially
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more informative, than the series of cursor locations
onwhich our exploratory investigation has focused. An
increase in the time of each bargaining period beyond
10 seconds and the incorporation of bargaining features
suchasverbal communication, nonverbal gestures (e.g.,
facial expressions, body language), and physiological
responses (e.g., skin conductance, pupil dilation, brain
activity) are likely to improve predictive performance.
Our results should therefore be considered as a lower
bound regarding the predictive power of process data,
and an invitation to bargaining researchers to expand
the scope of the data that are collected.
Finally, we acknowledge that our laboratory bar-
gaining institution deliberately omits many features of
natural bargaining. Lifelike bargaining is often face-
to-face, has little anonymity, uses natural language,
includes repetition and resulting reputations, and typ-
ically has two-sided private information. Moreover,
individual differences in the bargainers’ economic
preferences (e.g., risk taking) and psychological traits
(e.g., impulsivity, personality measures) may also play
a role and provide additional explanatory power. The
addition of more lifelike features can also be eas-
ily done step-by-step, as part of a research program
reviving interest in unstructured bargaining. Typically,
the addition of natural institutional properties and
accounting for individual differences make it harder to
figure out theoretically what behavior will result. The
opposite is true when machine learning is used: the
addition of more natural properties simply adds more
“features” that can be used for prediction.
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Appendix A. Mathematical Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 2: The Strike Condition
Amechanism is interim efficient if it is Pareto optimal for the
set of K + 1 agents: the informed player for each pie size, and
the uninformed player.
Following FKS, we first show that strikes in the “best” pie
size piK are never efficient for the class of direct mechanisms
that we consider. That is, if the mechanism µ  {γk , xk}Kk1 is
efficient, then it must be the case that γK  1.
If µ is an efficient mechanism, then the incentive compati-
bility conditions must hold, and so by Lemma 1, γK ≥ γk for
all k ≤ K. If γK  1 − δ < 1, we can define a new mechanism
µ∗ with γ∗K  1, γ
∗
k  γk + δ, for all k < K, and x
∗
k  xk , for all k.
The mechanism µ∗ does not affect the uninformed player’s
expected payoff and does not affect the IC constraints (as both
sides of the inequality increase by the same amount, δpiK),
but it increases the informed player’s payoff by δpiK in state K
and by δpik in states 1, . . . ,K − 1, so the original mechanism
cannot be efficient.
Next, if γk , k < K, can be increased without violating the IC
constraint, the informed bargainer’s payoff in states j , k are
unaffected, as is the uninformed bargainer’s, while player Ik ,
the informed bargainer in state k, is made better off. There-
fore, efficiency requires that the left-hand side of Equation (4)
holds at equality:
(γk+1 − γk)pik+1  xk+1 − xk , ∀ k. (A.1)
We make use of Equation (A.1) to derive Lemma 2, the
strike condition, below.
Lemma 2. The strike condition: For IR and IC mechanisms,
strikes in state k are ex ante efficient if
pik
pik+1
<
(1−∑kj1 p j)
(1−∑k−1j1 p j)  Pr(pi ≥ pik+1)Pr(pi ≥ pik) . (A.2)
Proof. To derive the strike condition, consider mechanisms
µ  {γk , xk}Kk1 and µ∗  {γk + δk , xk + dk}Kk1, which satisfy IR
and IC, and assume that both satisfy (A.1). Since µ∗ satis-
fies (A.1), we have
(xk+1+ dk+1)− (xk + dk) ((γk+1+ δk+1)− (γk + δk))pik+1. (A.3)
By subtracting (A.1) from (A.3), we find a useful condition
that
dk+1 − dk  (δk+1 − δk)pik+1. (A.4)
Next, assume that strikes are not efficient in states k +
1, . . . ,K, so that γj  1 if j > k, but assume that γk < 1. This
implies that dk+1  · · ·  dK .
Let ∆Vk and ∆U represent the difference in payoffs
between µ∗ and µ for the informed player in state k and
the uninformed player, respectively. If µ∗ dominates µ, then
∆Vk ≥ 0 for all k, and∆U ≥ 0, and at least one of these inequal-
ities is strict.
First, consider the K conditions for the informed player.
∆V1  δ1pi1 − d1 ≥ 0;
...
...
∆Vj  δ jpi j − d j ≥ 0, j < k;
∆Vk  δkpik − dk ≥ 0;
∆Vj  δkpik+1 − dk ≥ 0, j > k.
Multiplying the conditions for players I1 , . . . , Ik by p j and
summing them up gives
k∑
j1
p jpi jδ j ≥
k∑
j1
p jd j .
Multiplying the equation for player k by (1−∑k−1j1 p j) gives(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik ≥
(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
dk .
Adding up these two conditions gives
k∑
j1
p jpi jδ j +
(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik ≥
k∑
j1
p jd j +
(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
dk . (A.5)
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Next, we consider the uninformed player. If µ∗ domi-
nates µ, it must be the case that the uninformed player’s
payoff from µ∗ is at least as large as in µ.
∆U 
K∑
j1
p jd j 
k∑
j1
p jd j +
(
1−
k∑
j1
p j
)
dk+1 ≥ 0
k∑
j1
p jd j +
(
1−
k∑
j1
p j
)
(dk − δkpik+1) ≥ 0
k−1∑
j1
p jd j + pkdk +
(
1−
k∑
j1
p j
)
dk −
(
1−
k∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik+1 ≥ 0
k−1∑
j1
p jd j +
(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
dk −
(
1−
k∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik+1 ≥ 0
k−1∑
j1
p jd j +
(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
dk ≥
(
1−
k∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik+1 (A.6)
Combining Equations (A.5) and (A.6) gives
k−1∑
j1
p jpi jδ j +
(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik ≥
k−1∑
j1
p jd j +
(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
(dk)
≥
(
1−
k∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik+1. (A.7)
And this implies that
k−1∑
j1
p jpi jδ j +
(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik ≥
(
1−
k∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik+1. (A.8)
To examine whether strikes are efficient in state k, suppose
µ∗ and µ have identical strike rates in all states j < k. Then, δ j
equals 0 for all j < k, implying that(
1−
k−1∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik ≥
(
1−
k∑
j1
p j
)
δkpik+1. (A.9)
Then, δk > 0 implies that strikes are inefficient in state k if
pik
pik+1
≥ (1−
∑k
j1 p j)
(1−∑k−1j1 p j) ,
implying that strikes are efficient in state k if
pik
pik+1
<
(1−∑kj1 p j)
(1−∑k−1j1 p j) ,
or alternatively
pik
pik+1
<
Pr(pi ≥ pik+1)
Pr(pi ≥ pik) .  (A.10)
A.2. Proof of Remark 1: Deal Rates Are Linear in the
Pie Size for Equal Splits
Proof. If the uninformed player’s payoff is equal to half of the
informed player’s payoff in the direct bargainingmechanism,
then xk  12γkpik . Substituting this into (A.1), we have
1
2 (γk+1pik+1 − γkpik) (γk+1 − γk)pik+1. (A.11)
If we assume that the difference between successive pie sizes
is constant, then pik −pik−1 ∆ (note that this condition holds
in our experiment). Adding and subtracting ∆ to the left-
hand side of Equation (A.11), we have
1
2 (γk+1pik+1 − γk(pik +∆−∆)) (γk+1 − γk)pik+1 ,
1
2 (γk+1pik+1 − γk(pik+1 −∆)) (γk+1 − γk)pik+1 ,
1
2 (γk+1 − γk)pik+1 + 12γk∆ (γk+1 − γk)pik+1 ,
which implies that
γk∆ (γk+1 − γk)pik+1 , (A.12)
and therefore also that
γk−1∆ (γk − γk−1)pik . (A.13)
Subtracting (A.13) from (A.12), we have
(γk − γk−1)∆ (γk+1 − γk)pik+1 − (γk − γk−1)pik ,
(γk − γk−1)∆+ (γk − γk−1)pik  (γk+1 − γk)pik+1 ,
(γk − γk−1)(pik +∆) (γk+1 − γk)pik+1.
Since pik +∆ pik+1, this implies that
γk − γk−1  γk+1 − γk .  (A.14)
Equation (A.14) shows that the rate of change of the deal
rate as a function of the pie size is constant whenever the effi-
ciency condition (Equation (A.1)) holds and the incremental
change in pie sizes is constant.
We can also use the results in Equations (A.12) and (A.14)
to derive deal rates.
For the efficient equilibrium, we set γ4 , γ5, and γ6 equal
to 1. Equation (A.12) is then trivially satisfied for pie sizes 4
and higher. Then, Equation (A.12) implies that
γ3  (1− γ4)4 γ3  45 ,
and therefore γk − γk−1  15 , so that
(γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , γ4 , γ5 , γ6) ( 25 , 35 , 45 , 1, 1, 1). (A.15)
For the equal-split equilibrium,we set γ6 1; then, we have
γ5  (1− γ5)6 γ5  67 ,
and therefore γk − γk−1  17 , so that
(γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , γ4 , γ5 , γ6) ( 27 , 37 , 47 , 57 , 67 , 1), (A.16)
which is consistent with our results for the equal-split
equilibrium.
Appendix B. Session Information
Summary information of all of the experimental sessions
(location, number of subjects, and gender by role) is recapit-
ulated in Table B.1.
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Table B.1. Session Information, I-Informed, U-Uninformed
Session no. Location Date N I Male I Female U Male U Female
1 Caltech 12/1/2011 10 3 2 3 2
2 Caltech 12/8/2011 10 2 3 2 3
3 Caltech 1/9/2012 8 3 1 2 2
4 Caltech 1/11/2012 16 5 3 5 3
5 Caltech 2/28/2012 8 3 1 1 3
6 UCLA 5/11/2012 18 6 3 6 3
7 UCLA 5/11/2012 20 4 6 6 4
8 UCLA 5/11/2012 20 6 4 6 4
Total 110 32 23 31 24
Appendix C. List of Process Features and
Associated Marginal Effects
Figure C.1 summarizes all of the process features used to
predict bargaining outcomes. We provide further details of
calculating some of the features below.
• Initial difference negative? A binary indicator that equals 1
if the initial offer of the informed player is greater than
the initial uninformed player’s demand and zero other-
wise.
Figure C.1. (Color online) Bargaining Process Features Used for Outcome Prediction (Deal 1) and Their Estimated
Marginal Effects
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• Positions ever matched? A binary indicator that equals 1
if the players’ bargaining positions had previously matched
and they later changed their minds.
• Informed/uninformed first change T. The first time in
the game in which the informed/uninformed player has
updated his or her initial bargaining position.
• T since informed/uninformed last change T. The time since
the last time in which the informed/uninformed player has
updated his or her bargaining position.
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• Informed/uninformed first/last change mag. The magnitude
of the last informed/uninformed position change.
• # informed/uninformed changes. The number of times that
the informed/uninformed player has changed his or her bar-
gaining position since the start of the game.
• Informed/mean change mag. The mean magnitude of
change in the informed/uninformed player when he or she
changed bargaining positions.
• First change T. The first time in the game in which either
player has updated his or her initial bargaining position.
• T since last change. The time since the last time in which
either player has updated his or her bargaining position.
• Informed/uninformed moved first? A binary indicator that
equals 1 if the informed/uninformed player was the first to
change his or her bargaining position in the game.
• Informed/uninformed weighted avg.Aweighted sum of the
informed/uninformed bargaining positions across time.
T∑
t0
wtxt , (C.1)
such that t denotes time (between 0 and the current time T,
sampled in a 0.1 sec resolution) and xt is bargaining position
in time t. The weight wt equals
wt 
t2∑T
q0 q2
, (C.2)
where q is an aggregation index. This results a linear com-
bination where later bargaining positions are weighted more
heavily than earlier ones.
• Current informed/uninformed/both are focal? A binary indi-
cator that equals 1 if the informed/uninformed/both players
bargaining positions match the half of either possible pie size
(i.e., 0.4, 0.6, 1, 1.4, 1.6, 2, 2.4, 2.6, 3).
Appendix D. Instructions
This is an experiment about bargaining. You will play 120
rounds of a bargaining game.
In the game, one participant (the informed player) is told
the total amount of money (pie size) in each round. This
amount will be $1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, chosen randomly in each
trial. The amount will appear at the top-left corner of the
screen.
The other player is not informed of the pie size.
During each round, participants bargain over the unin-
formed player’s payoff.
The roles are randomly selected and fixed for the duration
of the experiment. Before each round, informed and unin-
formed players are randomly matched.
Participants negotiate by clicking on a scale from $0 to $6
(see Figure 1). Amounts on the scale represent the unin-
formed player’s payoff.
During the first two seconds, participants select their ini-
tial offers. Note that the initial location of the cursors is ran-
dom. In the following 10 seconds, the participants bargain,
using the mouse to select payoffs for the uninformed player.
Clicking on a different part of the scale moves the cursor.
A deal occurs when the cursors are in the same place for
1.5 seconds. When both cursors are in the same place on the
scale, a green rectangle will appear (see Figure 2).
If a deal is made, the informed player’s payoff is equal to
the pie size minus the negotiated uninformed player’s pay-
off. If the agreement exceeds the total amount of money, the
payoff will be negative.
If no deal has been made after 10 seconds of bargaining,
both participants get $0.
Following each trial, the uninformed player will be shown
of the pie size.
The game has a total of 120 trials.
Before the experiment begins, there will be 15 training tri-
als, to allow you to practice.
At the end of the game, you will receive payment based on
randomly selected 15% of your trials.
You will receive a $5 participation fee in addition to what-
ever you earn from playing the game.
Quiz
Total amount is $3. Cursors were matched in $1. How much
money does the informed participant get? How much does
the uninformed participant get?
Total amount is $2. Cursors were matched in $4.1. How
much money does the informed participant get? How much
does the uninformed participant get?
One second before the end of the trial, both participants
have agreed on payoff of $2 and the green rectangle appears.
What is going to happen when the trial ends?
Both participants have agreed on payoff of $2 and the
green rectangle appears. After one second, the uninformed
player changed his offer to $2.5. What is going to happen?
Endnotes
1See Cramton (1984), Fudenberg et al. (1985), Rubinstein (1985),
Grossman and Perry (1986), Gul and Sonnenschein (1988), and
Ausubel and Deneckere (1993).
2See Ochs and Roth (1989), Camerer et al. (1993), Mitzkewitz and
Nagel (1993), Güth et al. (1996), Kagel et al. (1996), Güth and Van
Damme (1998), Rapoport et al. (1998), Kagel and Wolfe (2001),
Srivastava (2001), Croson et al. (2003), Johnson et al. (2002), and Kriss
et al. (2013).
3See Kristensen and Gärling (1997), Galinsky andMussweiler (2001),
Van Poucke and Buelens (2002), Mason et al. (2013), and Ames and
Mason (2015).
4For other recent “protocol-free” bargaining theories, see Fuchs and
Skrzypacz (2013), Fanning (2016), and Simsek and Yildiz (2016).
5For reviews, see Kennan and Wilson (1993), Ausubel et al. (2002),
and Thompson et al. (2010).
6See Schelling (1960), Roth (1985), Kristensen and Gärling (1997),
Janssen (2001), Binmore and Samuelson (2006), Janssen (2006),
Bardsley et al. (2010), Isoni et al. (2013, 2014), Hargreaves Heap et al.
(2014), Luhan et al. (2017), and Sontuoso and Bhatia (2017).
7A comparable finding in sender–receiver games is that senders will-
ingly share more private information than is selfishly rational (see
Crawford 2003, Cai and Wang 2006, Wang et al. 2010).
8Anbarci and Feltovich (2013, 2016), Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2015),
and Luhan et al. (2017) are other recent experimental papers that
investigated unstructured bargaining under various information
conditions.
9See Kritikos and Bolle (2001), Charness and Rabin (2002),
Engelmann and Strobel (2004), Engelmann and Strobel (2006), Fehr
et al. (2006), Bolton and Ockenfels (2006), Durante et al. (2014), and
El Harbi et al. (2015)
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10For example, economics students are inclined to favor efficiency
over equality, females are more egalitarian than males, and political
preferences do not seem to have an effect (Engelmann and Strobel
2004, Fehr et al. 2006).
11See Yukl (1974b), White and Neale (1994), White et al. (1994),
Kristensen and Gärling (1997), Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001), Van
Poucke and Buelens (2002), Buelens and Van Poucke (2004), Mason
et al. (2013), and Ames and Mason (2015).
12See also the discussion in Kennan and Wilson (1993, section 6.1).
13Many possible explanations have been proposed for the prevalence
of equal splitting, including social norms (Andreoni and Bernheim
2009), pure dislike of unequal distributions (Fehr and Schmidt 1999),
beliefs about the preferences of one’s partner (Chmura et al. 2005),
and evolutionary stability (Bolton 1997, Young 1993).
14This result is used in the derivation of the strike condition for
Lemma 2. See Equation (A.1) in Appendix A. See also equations (1)
and (2) of Forsythe et al. (1991).
15The multiple of $0.2 was chosen as a compromise between $0.1
(too fine a resolution for coordinating in a short game) and $0.5
(a resolution that would not allow for testing the use of focal points,
as every possible offer would be a half of an integer pie). All of the
experimental results are consistent when considering only the even
pie games, in which subjects can exactly agree on half of the pie.
16A video demonstration of the task is available on https://www
.youtube.coms/watch?vy7pKh1EJsvM& (published November 27,
2014).
17We chose 10 seconds as a long enough time period to observe the
bargaining process, and short enough to collect a large number of
observations per subject in each one of the six pie sizes. Given likely
subject fatigue, there is an obvious trade-off between having a lot of
learning across many sessions (especially with six pie sizes, which
permits nuanced prediction about deal rates) and then having to
make the sessions short. We have piloted longer time periods, and
the results were not substantially different. Also, the participants
have 15 practice rounds, making them familiar with the fast bargain-
ing process.
18A small fraction (less than 2.5%) of the games were excluded from
analysis because of a software bug in the first sessions.
19 In our experimental interface, players communicated their bids in
integermultiples of 0.2 and therefore could notmake offers of exactly
0.5, 1.5, or 2.5. We consider offers that are within 0.1 of these values
(that are as close as one could get to them) asmatching half of integer
pies.
20The deal is closed 1.5 seconds after the bargainers’ positions have
matched.
21We employ linear probability models for the ease of testing and
interpreting coefficient values and interpreting the effects of control
variables; logistic regressions give similar results.
22Hansen (2007) shows that the cluster-robust variance estimator is
appropriate when the number of groups is small, as long as the
number of within-group observations is large. See the discussions in
Angrist and Pischke (2008, chap. 8) and Cameron and Miller (2015).
23With session controls and standard errors clustered at the session
level, a test of the full model would require 10 constraints (3 for the
model coefficients, and 1 for each of the session controls), which is
more than our degrees of freedom (7). We therefore report results
from tests of the joint hypotheses on (α0 , α1 , α2) on the pooled regres-
sion model (Model A), using standard errors clustered at the session
level. An F-test of the null hypothesis (α0 , α1 , α2)  ( 15 , 15 ,− 15 ) rejects
the null at p < 0.001, with F(3, 7)  134.78. An F-test of the null
hypothesis (α0 , α1 , α2)  ( 17 , 17 , 0) rejects the null at p < 0.001, with
F(3, 7) 78.19.
24For instance, the deal rate when pi  6 is 0.83 in the last 20 rounds,
pooling the data from all sessions.
25 In some interesting models of bargaining with self-interested pref-
erences, and under certain experimental conditions, strikes can occur
even with complete information (e.g., Roth and Malouf 1979, Roth
et al. 1981, Roth and Murnighan 1982, Roth 1985, Haller and Holden
1990, Herreiner and Puppe 2004, Gächter and Riedl 2005, Gachter
and Riedl 2006, Embrey et al. 2014). If the forces operating in such
models and environments also apply in our private-information set-
tings, the strike rates could be larger than those predicted by the
mechanism design approach.
26Pooling the demandsmakes sense because the uninformed players
have no information regarding the realization of the pie that might
be deduced from the behavior of the informed player at the initial-
offer stage.
27A $1 increase corresponds to the distance between the 25th per-
centile ($0.4) and the 75th percentile ($1.4) of the distribution of
initial offers.
28By the revelation principle, every equilibrium in our setting corre-
sponds to a payoff-equivalent equilibrium of the direct mechanism.
As the direct mechanism is “process free,” process features should
not have predictive power in equilibrium after controlling for pie
size.
29A LASSO-penalized logistic regression maximizes the standard
logistic regression log-likelihood function minus a penalty term
equal to a weighted sum of their absolute values of the regression
coefficients (their L1 norm) to overcome potential overfitting of the
training data.
30To capture a nonlinear dependency of the deal rate on the pie size,
the pie size is represented using five dummy variables, denoting the
different pies (such that the $1 pie is the baseline category).
31We included only trials that were still in progress (when a deal has
not yet been achieved), and excluded trials in which the offer and
demand were equal at the relevant time stamp.
32The optimization procedure was performed using the “lassoglm”
function implemented in MATLAB under its default setting. Thus,
we first estimate λmax, the largest value of the penalty parameter λ
that gives a nonnull model, and perform optimization by exploring
a geometric sequence of 100 values between 0.0001λmax and λmax.
33As the LASSO procedure is sensitive to the scale of the inputs, all
independent variables were standardized (z-scored) prior to model
training.
34We used decision thresholds between 0 and 1 on a grid with a
resolution of 0.01.
35The AUC is closely related to the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon
U-statistic (Hanley and McNeil 1982).
36We formally tested the predictive accuracy of process data above
and beyond the pie size by comparing the mean square error of the
model that was trained using both process data and pie to the model
that was trained using only the pie. Paired t-tests of the squared
errors from both models (with adjustments for clustering at the ses-
sion level) showed that adding process data significantly decreased
out-of-sample prediction error for all times greater than or equal to
three seconds (at the 5% level, Bonferroni corrected).
37The “post-LASSO” procedure consisted of three steps. First, we
optimized the LASSO tuning parameter λ using 10-fold cross-
validation on the entire data set. Second, we conducted model selec-
tion by fitting a logistic LASSO regression using the optimized tun-
ing parameter to the data. Finally, we fitted an ordinary logistic
regression to the data, using the features with nonzero LASSO coef-
ficients from the second stage.
38When the design matrix includes several highly correlated vari-
ables that are related to the response variable (as in the case at hand),
LASSO tends to pick only one of them and shrinks the influence
of the rest to zero (Tibshirani 2011). Thus, LASSO might discard
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additional weak (but important) predictors that are highly corre-
lated with stronger predictors, which may also prove to be useful
for understanding how bargaining process influences outcome. Cru-
cially, previous investigations of LASSO’s performance when multi-
collinearity is present (van de Geer et al. 2013, Hebiri and Lederer
2013, Oyeyemi et al. 2015) have shown that predictive accuracy is
not harmed by multicollinearity, and even if this had been an issue,
it would have biased the predictive accuracy of the process features
downward. Thus, the predictive accuracy of process features that
we report can be seen as a lower bound to what can potentially be
achieved.
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